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IS THE LABOR ACT DOING ITS JOB?*
Julius Getman**
This has been a period for re-examining the National Labor Re-
lations Act by all segments of the industrial relations community. Ac-
ademic analyses are marked by unhappiness with the current state of
law. This theme is fairly new. Ten years ago, one would have found
general agreement among labor, management and most academic
scholars that the Act was doing its job, helping to provide free choice
and free collective bargaining.
The consensus which existed a short time ago no longer exists.
On the right, where free market analysis has become a prominent
feature, there is the claim that the NLRA is inefficient and causes
interference with the benevolent working of the market. Thus, for
example, at a recent symposium held by the Yale Law Journal to
commemorate the New Deal, Professor Richard Epstein of the Uni-
versity of Chicago suggested that the entire NLRA be done away
with.' In its place, he suggested that we return to the common law.
He concluded on the basis of economic and political theory that a
common law system based entirely on contract is more likely to pro-
mote the interests of workers, management and society in general.
On the other side, there is a growing body of critical scholarship
which suggests that the existing system has been shaped to reduce
rank and file militancy and has helped to deprive unions of their vi-
tality.2 Some of the critics believe that the results are a system which
benefits the union hierarchy, but is harmful to employees. Some view
arbitration as a technique for harnessing discontent which might oth-
erwise be manifest in a more socially useful way, and collective bar-
gaining as a technique by which the workers are co-opted.
Stirrings of discontent can be heard now even among the moder-
ates. Chairman Miller's comments reflected some of this discontent
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when he argued that the processes take too long, that there is too
much law, and that the rules do not always achieve their purposes.3
In the next few minutes, I would like to address this criticism, and
then give a very brief suggestion as to possible reform.
My first reaction is to protect the existing system from its critics.
I am disappointed by those who are unable to recognize the genuine
achievements of our industrial relations system. Collective bargaining
has provided real gains for employees in terms of benefits, wages and
protection against arbitrary treatment. It has given labor a significant
voice in the running of important enterprises. The system of arbitra-
tion, customarily employed to resolve grievances, is the most success-
ful experiment in dispute resolution in our time.
Recently, criticism from unions and union supporters has fo-
cused on the organizing process. Much of the criticism of the NLRA
from both the academics and labor leaders is based on the assump-
tion that labor needs increased protection against management con-
sultants, who manipulate employees into voting against unions
through a combination of fear and phony promises. I think that as-
sumption is a distortion. There is a conspiracy of sorts by unions and
the consultants to make it appear that the consultants have much
more ability to manipulate votes than they actually have. This pro-
vides an excuse for the labor defeats and an inducement for clients of
the management consultants.
In the course of a study I conducted of union-representation
campaigns,4 I was surprised by how often organizers explained their
losses by claiming that management had violated the law and fright-
ened the workers to vote against the union. This suggests that if the
law were strengthened, if there were more limitations on manage-
ment's right to speak, or if there were more concern about discipli-
nary actions during a campaign, unions would win a higher percent-
age of the elections than they do. I believe that this is incorrect. After
a field study, in which we analyzed thirty-two different campaigns,
we concluded that while campaigns may make a difference, the law
regulating the campaigns is not very important.
I recently had the interesting experience of watching a superb
union organizing effort at my own university. The Yale Clerical &
3. See generally Miller, The National Labor Relations Board: From 1970 and Into the
Future, 15 STETSON L. REV. 21 (1985).
4. J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND RE-
ALITY (1976).
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Technical Workers Union (Hotel and Restaurant Employees) had en-
listed a well educated, tremendously enthusiastic, deeply committed
group of organizers. They considered it their prime job to enlist the
leaders of the rank and file and to encourage them to speak out. This
method turned out to be very successful, not only in organizing but
in establishing a militant union which was able to conduct effectively
a long strike which very few knowledgeable people thought they
could sustain.
I do not think that unions have paid enough attention to the
potential in their own ranks and I think a well run union organizing
effort can blunt the effect of a typical management campaign. One of
the people who conducted the Yale organizing drive said to me, "I
like it when I have to deal with a management consultant because
they are so predictable. I know what they are going to do and I can
innoculate the employees. Every time I predict what they are going
to do and they end up doing it, it makes me look good." I am amazed
how rarely that point of view is manifested in union organization.
I believe that unions tend to overstress the importance of the
"law of organization." This emphasis is symptomatic of a wider syn-
drome of overstressing the importance of the law in labor relations, a
syndrome which afflicts union leaders, most Board members and
leading academics.' I can, however, understand the unhappiness of
labor with the current state of the law.
Thus, while I agree with Chairman Miller that the duty to bar-
gain is not very important as a practical matter, its current diminu-
tion reflects the courts' unfortunate conclusion that collective bar-
gaining is inefficient and should be discouraged, a conclusion with
which I strongly disagree. Similarly, the growth of the duty of fair
representation has reached proportions which I find extremely troub-
lesome. This growth has resulted from a widely accepted premise
5. For example, it is often taught that the Steelworkers Trilogy made a significant contri-
bution to the status of labor arbitration. I believe that it has worked the other way. Before the
law recognized the promise to arbitrate and made arbitration awards enforceable, the parties
were routinely going to arbitration and obeying the awards. Both sides recognized that they had
an interest in making arbitration successful. Once the courts became involved and stated
ground rules under which the parties should operate, they laid the ground work for increased
litigation. The parties began to challenge arbitration awards with great skill and effectiveness.
In various courts of appeals in the United States today, arbitration awards are not routinely
enforced. In the Sixth Circuit, for example, most arbitration awards are rejected. Courts have
seized on the requirement that an award draw its essence from the collective bargaining agree-
ment to overturn awards in which the arbitrator's opinion focuses on such things as past prac-
tice, industrial relations, or elementary notions of justice.
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that, if more doctrine in the direction of individual rights is created,
the unions will be more responsive to the needs and interests of indi-
vidual employees. According to this theory, the courts, by broadening
the duty of fair representation, force the unions to do a better job.
My experience suggests that if unions are held to unrealistic stan-
dards of representation, the result will be to overly legalize the labor
movement. That would not be good for the workers they represent.
Because of the technicalities involved in providing fair representa-
tion, unions have had to hold back from doing some of the things
that they have traditionally done best.
The growth of the duty of fair representation fails to recognize
the enormous difference between a rule that requires labor unions to
behave in a certain way and the actual behavior that results. Ex-
panding the duty of fair representation convinces unions to be cau-
tious. Many are currently taking all discipline cases to arbitration.
This is costly to unions and leads arbitrators to assume that in many
cases unions are just going through the motions.
I believe however that there are at least two areas in which the
NLRA is important and helps to achieve positive results. One in-
volves the conduct of elections. The fact that the labor board con-
ducts elections, which determine whether or not a union is to be an
exclusive representative, is significant. I do not think the rules regu-
lating the conduct of the elections are important, but I think the very
fact that elections are conducted and that unions may emerge from
these elections as the exclusive certified bargaining representatives is
extremely important.
The second important legal policy is the promotion of free collec-
tive bargaining. Paradoxically, the significance of the law in this area
is to be found in the fact that the rules do not shape the bargaining
process. The duty to bargain over mandatory topics and the differen-
tiation between mandatory and permissive topics are not in them-
selves noteworthy. What is important is the fact that, once a
mandatory topic is raised by the parties, no one but the parties has
any input as to what kind of agreement will be reached. Also, there is
no mechanism by which the distinction between mandatory and per-
missive topics is enforced. Therefore, if either a union or an employee
wants to insist on a permissive topic in the final agreement, it may do
so if it has the bargaining power.
I am a cautious supporter of both the doctrine of exclusivity and
the concept of free collective bargaining. Exclusivity has facilitated
the successes of collective bargaining. Exclusivity permits the adop-
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tion of uniform working conditions for all employees. Without it, it
would be impossible to utilize the type of seniority schemes provided
for by most agreements. Because of the widespread use of seniority,
the idea has developed that employees by their labor develop an in-
terest in their jobs which management can not remove without rea-
son. The concept of seniority gives meaning to limitations on employ-
ers' rights of discharge. It is seniority which makes a collective
bargaining agreement enforceable. For example, an employer cannot
easily discriminate after a grievance is filed because the seniority pro-
visions protect the employee's job, his fringe benefits and his right to
promotion. Without that power of seniority, the enforcement mecha-
nism against unjust discharges simply would not work.
The scope of collective bargaining and the influence of American
unions in labor relations are largely protected by the doctrine of ex-
clusivity. In countries in which exclusivity does not exist, unions tend
to be more political and less important in the day-to-day operations
of an enterprise. On the other hand, there are problems that go with
the notion of exclusivity. Its basic operation is to inhibit free choice,
to require employees, whether they wish to or not, to be represented
by a union and to prevent other employees from representation by
the union of their choice.
The notion of free collective bargaining also has its costs. One of
these costs is that the power of labor stems not from the merits of its
case, but from the strength of the union and the type of industry
involved. A union of airline pilots, for example, is able to achieve
things which a union of clerical workers often cannot achieve. These
achievements have little relation to the justice of the case, but rather
are indicative of the union's strategic position in its industry. A sec-
ond major cost is the centrality of strikes. The only thing to note
about the key role of strikes is the absence of a good alternative.
Finally, my most powerful reaction is that after fifty years of the
NLRA we know remarkably little about the system it has helped to
establish. Labor relations abounds with myths because there are so
few studies of its actual workings. Except with respect to union elec-
tions, where I took part in a major empirical study, I have based my
talk today on impressions and hunches, a little bit of practical experi-
ence, and knowledge I gathered through discussions with labor and
management people. I do not have the type of data which would per-
mit me to make solid recommendations. In most areas nobody else
does, either. We need careful studies of what is actually going on in
labor relations to serve as a prelude to reform. The eventual reform, I
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hope, would reduce the amount of law, eliminating many of its confu-
sions and technicalities while maintaining the basic features of the
existing system.
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